

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 IO-13 ISO-00 EA-10 ACDA-12 EB-08
OMB-01 TRSE-00 DOE-11 SOE-02 CEQ-01 OES-07 MCE-00
CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05
PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /136 W
-----065098 281850Z /41

R 281750Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8388
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO
DIA WASHDC

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USSALTTWO/CTB

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PARM, MPOL, SALT, SOPN, PEPR, UR, US, XJ
SUBJECT: MOSCOW TV ON ARMS CONTROL, HORN OF AFRICA

REF: (A) MOSCOW 3047 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 3089 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: MOSCOW TV PROGRAM "STUDIO NINE" ON FEB. 26
DEALT WITH SALT, RB/ER, THE HORN OF AFRICA AND, IN A VERY
ROUTINE MANNER, THE MIDDLE EAST. ON SALT GREAT EMPHASIS
WAS PLACED ON ALLEGED U.S. EFFORTS TO CHANGE MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE TERMS ON SEA AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE
MISSILES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE
RB/ER WEAPON WAS DISCUSSED AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF U.S.
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EFFORTS TO GAIN SUPERIORITY AND WAS CONDEMNED AS LOWERING
THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. EFFORTS IN THE U.S. TO MAKE A
LINKAGE BETWEEN EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, SUCH AS
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, WITH SALT WERE DESCRIBED AS "VERY
DANGEROUS". END SUMMARY.

1. MOSCOW TELEVISION PROGRAM "STUDIO NINE" FEB. 26

FEATURED DISCUSSIONS OF SALT AND NEUTRON BOMB BY IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDER BOVIN AND EVGENII PRIMYAKOV, DIRECTOR OF ORIENTAL STUDIES INSTITUTE. BOVIN CARRIED BURDEN OF DISCUSSION ON SALT, BEGINNING WITH A SELECTED REVIEW OF STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS. HOLDING THAT CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE U.S. HAVE SET OUT TO UNDERMINE AGREEMENT REACHED LAST YEAR ON TERMS FOR LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS. BOVIN CLAIMED THAT THESE CIRCLES ARE TRYING TO OBTAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO, HE SAID, IN THE CASE OF CRUISE MISSILES.

2. BOVIN CLAIMED THAT A COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED ON CRUISE MISSILES BY WHICH THERE WOULD BE NO TESTING OR DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-LAUNCHED OR GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 600 KMS UNDER THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL TO SALT II. HE CLAIMED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD FOUND THIS POSITION ACCEPTABLE. THEN, HE SAID, THE U.S. TOOK AN "UNREASONABLE POSITION", RAISING THE ISSUE OF PLACING AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ON TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, THE U.S. SUBSEQUENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD FREEZE TESTING OF SLCM AND GLCM FOR THREE YEARS BUT THAT AFTER THE THREE-YEAR LIFE OF THE PROTOCOL THE U.S. WOULD BE FREE TO BASE THESE MISSILES ABROAD AND TO DEVELOP GREATER RANGES FOR THEM. BOVIN SAID THAT THE NOTION OF BASING CRUISE MISSILES BEYOND U.S. BORDERS IS PARTICULARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USSR. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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3. PRIMYAKOV THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT U.S. EFFORTS SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE USSR. HE CLAIMED THAT IN RECENT YEARS MORE SOBER VOICES HAVE BEEN HEARD IN THE U.S. BUT LATELY IT APPEARS THAT THE VOICES OF THE HARDLINERS ARE BECOMING MORE PROMINENT. THIS CUE LED BOVIN TO CITE THE NEUTRON BOMB AS PROOF OF THIS ASSERTION. THE CLAIM THAT THE RB/ER IS SOLELY A TACTICAL WEAPON, HE SAID, IS BASED ON THE NOTION OF A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR, WHICH BOVIN ASSERTED IS MERELY AN ABSTRACTION: IN REALITY, THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD SERVE AS THE PROLOGUE TO TOTAL NUCLEAR WAR. BOVIN THEN IDENTIFIED THIS FACTOR AS THE MAIN DANGER OF THE RB/ER IN THAT THE WEAPON LOWERS THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, MAKING NUCLEAR WAR MORE POSSIBLE.

4. STATING THAT THE NEUTRON BOMB IS AN EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION IN WHICH WEAPONS' DEVELOPMENT ACTUALLY DIMINISHES SECURITY, BOVIN THEN CITED A RECENT ARTICLE BY CHARLES YOST TO THE EFFECT THAT EACH NEW WEAPON LEADS TO GREATER INSTABILITY. YOST WAS QUOTED AS STATING THAT

IF SALT II IS NOT CONCLUDED AND SALT III DOES NOT FOLLOW,
THE SITUATION WILL BECOME WORSE THAN IT IS NOW. THE
SENSIBLE COURSE ON RB/ER IS MUTUAL RENUNCIATION, BOVIN
SAID. BOVIN THEN WENT ON TO CITE USTINOV'S FEB. 22
SPEECH TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET LOVE OF PEACE SHOULD
NOT BE TAKEN AS A WEAKNESS. THE USSR IS READY TO COMPRO-
MISE, BUT IT HAS "ITS LIMITS", AS WERE SPELLED OUT IN
THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL OF FEB. 11. BOVIN CONCLUDED THESE
REMARKS BY SAYING THAT THIS IS WHAT CAN BE SAID OF THE
NEUTRON BOMB.

5. PRIMYAKOV SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT U.S. "UNPRIN-
CIPLED AND CYNICAL" POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE HORN. HE

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PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /136 W
-----065130 281857Z /42

R 281750Z FEB 78
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IMPLICITLY ACCUSED U.S. OF COUNTENANCING FLOW OF U.S.
ARMS TO SOMALIA FROM SUCH COUNTRIES AS PAKISTAN AND
SAUDIA ARABIA AND LINKED EGYPTIAN ARMS SUPPLY TO SOMALIA
WITH U.S. AGREEMENT TO SELL F5-E'S TO EGYPT. MOST
INTERESTING WAS PRIMYAKOV'S ATTACK ON ATTEMPTS BY U.S.
TO LINK ONGOING U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS,
E.G., INDIAN OCEAN AND SALT, WITH AN OUTCOME IN HORN
FAVORABLE TO U.S. (ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, PRIMYAKOV STATED
THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD ANNOUNCED THAT SINCE

EVENTS IN THE HORN WERE NOT GOING FAVORABLY TO THE U.S.
THE TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD BE SUSPENDED.
PRIMYAKOV SAID THAT THIS TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE
TALKS WERE GOING WELL (NEPLOKHO).) SOCIAL CHANGES ARE
TAKING PLACE IN THE WORLD, SAID PRIMYAKOV, AND SOVIET
UNION WILL NOT SIMPLY SUPPORT STATUS QUO; THEREFORE,
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ATTEMPTS BY U.S. TO MAKE LINKAGES BETWEEN SUCH EVENTS
IN WORLD AND U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS - ESPECIALLY ON
DISARMAMENT ISSUES - WILL ONLY RESULT IN A LACK OF
PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. THIS IS FIRST SIGNIFICANT
SOVIET COMMENTARY WE HAVE SEEN ON LINKAGE BETWEEN HORN
AND U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS.

6. COMMENT: ON THE QUESTION OF SALT, WE FOUND MOST
STRIKING THE REFERENCE TO AN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING A
BAN ON TESTING OF SLICM-GLSM IN THE PROTOCOL (THIS
ASSERTION ALSO APPEARED IN THE 11 FEB. PRAVDA EDITORIAL),
AND TO SUBSEQUENT U.S. EFFORTS TO REVISE THIS BAN. THE
OMISSION OF ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO NONCIRCUMVENTION/
NONTRANSFER IS CURIOUS GIVEN THE ATTENTION DEVOTED TO
THIS SUBJECT IN PRAVDA'S FEB. 11 EDITORIAL ARTICLE. THE
DISCUSSION OF THE NEUTRON BOMB WAS CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER
SOVIET COMMENTS. PRIMYAKOV'S FIRM REJECTION OF LINKAGE
BETWEEN EVENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND SALT SERVES TO
UNDERSCORE THE INTEREST MOSCOW CONTINUES TO SHOW IN CON-
CLUDING SALT II AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTY THE SOVIETS HAVE
IN ABSORBING THE LESSON THAT THEIR CONDUCT ELSEWHERE CAN
ADVERSELY EFFECT THE CHANCES OF A SALT AGREEMENT IN THE
SENATE. MATLOCK

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MOSCOW03148
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780092-0431
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t1978024/aaaaacsn.tel
Line Count: 204
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 110508d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 MOSCOW 3047, 78 MOSCOW 3089
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3555512
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MOSCOW TV ON ARMS CONTROL, HORN OF AFRICA
TAGS: PARM, MPOL, SOPN, PEPR, UR, US, XJ
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/110508d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014